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Abstract 
 
Human performance in task-switching paradigms is seen as a hallmark of executive-
control processes: switching between tasks induces switch costs (such that 
performance when changing from Task A to Task B is worse than on trials where the 
task repeats), which is generally attributed to executive control suppressing one task-
set and activating the other. However, even in cases where task-sets are not employed, 
as well as in computational modelling of task switching, switch costs can still be 
found. This observation has led to the hypothesis that associative-learning processes 
might be responsible for all or part of the switch cost in task-switching paradigms. To 
test which cognitive processes contribute to the presence of task-switch costs, pigeons 
performed two different tasks on the same set of stimuli in rapid alternation. The 
pigeons showed no sign of switch costs, even though performance on trial N was 
influenced by trial N-1, showing that they were sensitive to sequential effects. Using 
Pearce's (1987) model for stimulus generalisation, we conclude that they learned the 
task associatively - in particular, a form of Pavlovian-conditioned approach was 
involved - and that this was responsible for the lack of any detectable switch costs. 
Pearce's model also allows us to make interferences about the common occurrence of 
switch costs in the absence of task-sets in human participants and in computational 
models, in that they are likely due to instrumental learning and the establishment of an 
equivalence between cues signalling the same task. 
 
Keywords: task-switching -- associative learning -- executive control -- pigeons 
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Executive control is presumed to be at the core of the human ability to switch 
between two or more different tasks in rapid alternation, and task-switching 
paradigms have been used extensively as a tool to assess executive-control 
mechanisms in human behaviour (Dreisbach, 2012; Kiesel, Steinhauser, Wendt et al., 
2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). In the 
present experiment, this presumption is addressed through the use of a task-switching 
paradigm with a subject species, pigeons, which are widely thought not to have the 
capacity for executive control, but rather to rely on associative learning.  Our 
principal aims were, first, to investigate whether task-switching was possible on the 
basis of associative learning, and second, to investigate which cognitive processes 
contribute to the presence of task-switch costs." 
Commonly, task-switching paradigms involve the classification of the same 
set of stimuli along different stimulus dimensions, where the defining dimension 
switches frequently depending on the task that is currently being performed (Kiesel et 
al., 2010). A specific task cue indicates which task is relevant in a given trial: for 
example, subjects might be asked to judge a visual grating pattern by its spatial 
frequency when the colour yellow is presented, or to classify the same stimulus 
according to whether the pattern is vertically or horizontally orientated (whilst 
ignoring spatial frequency) when the colour red appears. 
Evidence for humans’ reliance on executive control in such paradigms is taken 
from the presence of 'switch costs' (Dreisbach, 2012; Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 
2003; Vandierendonck et al., 2010): humans generally take longer and make more 
errors during a 'task-switch' trial, in which the dimension that determines a correct 
response differs from the one in the previous trial (that is, participants have to switch 
from one task to the other) than in non-switch or 'task-repeat' trials, in which the same 
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task as in the previous trial is repeated and thus attention has to be paid to the same 
stimulus dimension as before (Dreisbach, 2012; Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). It is argued that switch costs exist because humans 
perform the executive control operations of identifying the current task, retrieving its 
specific stimulus-response rules into working memory (and deleting the rules of the 
previous task) and adjusting the response reaction to the new requirements, a process 
known as 'task-set reconfiguration' (Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). This 
process is necessary on switch trials but not on repeat trials, leading to a measurable 
difference in performance on these two types of trials. 
The easy detectability and reliability of switch costs have made task-switching 
paradigms a popular instrument to assess human executive control in both 
experimental and clinical settings. However, current theories in cognitive research 
suggest that humans possess two distinguishable learning processes: in addition to the 
explicit, rule-based category learning aided by executive control, which extracts 
information from a single dimension of a (multidimensional) stimulus, humans may 
also possess a more automatic, nonanalytic form of learning, in which behavioural 
responses are associated with the perceived stimulus as a whole (Ashby & Ell, 2001; 
Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007; Dreisbach, 2012; Forrest, 2012; McLaren, Forrest, 
McLaren et al., 2014; Smith & Grossman, 2008; Smith, Berg, Cook et al., 2012; 
Smith, Boomer, Zakrzewski et al., 2014). Given that the stimulus sets used in task-
switching paradigms are often small and contain easily distinguishable stimuli, 
performance in task-switching paradigms might be entirely the result of such 
associative-learning processes, i.e., the retrieval of cue-stimulus-response associations 
(Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Schneider & Logan, 2005; Wylie & Allport, 2000). Thus, 
5 
 
 
executive control might in fact not be necessary for task switching
1
. Learning to 
respond correctly could be accomplished by associating the overall visual appearance 
of a cue-stimulus combination with a certain response (Lea & Wills, 2008). Even 
when large stimulus set sizes are used to prevent participants from memorising 
individual stimulus-response combinations, each stimulus could be categorized by 
using all of its dimensions in combination (including the task cue) and computing its 
overall similarity to a stimulus, or a prototype image for many such stimuli, to which 
the correct response is known.  
Often, task-switching studies (e.g., Forrest, 2012; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; 
Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Schneider, 2015; Schneider & Logan, 2014) 
observe great impairments to performance for so-called incongruent stimuli: these are 
stimuli that are presented in all tasks but require different behavioural responses in 
each task. Performance in response to these response-incongruent stimuli is typically 
worse when compared to response-congruent stimuli, which afford the same response 
in all tasks. Whilst this 'congruency effect' can be explained in terms of executive 
control (e.g., by postulating that, during task switching, both the competing task-sets, 
including their respective stimulus-response rules, are held active in working memory 
and influence each other; cf. Meiran, 2000), it is more readily predicted by an 
associative learning account when dealing with relatively small sets of stimuli (Kiesel, 
Wendt, & Peters, 2007), indicating that nonanalytic associative processes might 
                                                 
1
 One possibility we do not consider here for reasons of space, is that executive 
control itself is a product of a complex cognitive architecture employing essentially 
associative processes (see Verbruggen, McLaren and Chambers, 2014, for more on 
this).  
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routinely play a substantial part in task switching, and perhaps even in the occurrence 
of switch costs. 
A few studies have explicitly tried to elicit an associative approach to task 
switching in humans (e.g., Dreisbach, 2012; Dreisbach, Goschke, & Haider, 2006, 
2007), either by using paradigms in which participants were only provided with a list 
of the cue-stimulus-response contingencies instead of full instructions for the 
underlying task rules, or by withholding any information and forcing participants to 
learn task contingencies by trial and error. The underlying hypothesis of these 
experiments was that, if humans performed task switching by retrieving implicit cue-
stimulus-response associations, they should not suffer from switch costs, since the 
responses following different stimuli would not be encoded in a way that recognises 
any analytic task-based hierarchies or different 'tasks' as such. Indeed, Dreisbach and 
colleagues only observed switch costs in humans who were aware of task rules; there 
was no sign of differential reaction times in task-switch and task-repeat trials when 
participants were trained in a way that promoted an associative acquisition of the 
paradigm. 
Although Dreisbach et al.'s (2006, 2007) results conformed to what would be 
expected when solving the task based on stimulus-response associations, their design 
differed from traditional task-switching paradigms. Conventional paradigms such as 
the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) use bivalent stimuli, so that participants require 
additional information about which task is currently relevant in order to categorise a 
stimulus accurately (for example in the form of a task cue). Dreisbach et al., however, 
used univalent stimuli, meaning that each stimulus on its own predicted the correct 
response perfectly, even when no additional information about the currently relevant 
task was available. Essentially, this design meant that there was no benefit to using 
7 
 
 
task rules. It has been shown that, under conventional task-switching conditions, 
switch costs are smaller when stimuli are univalent (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; 
Jersild, 1927; Kiesel et al., 2010; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 
1976). Therefore, the possibility remains that even an associative approach to task 
switching would create switch costs, but that the use of univalent stimuli in 
Dreisbach’s studies reduced switch costs to the point at which they became too small 
to be of statistical significance. Since bivalent stimuli cannot accurately predict the 
correct behavioural response without additional information from the task cues, a 
paradigm that utilised such stimuli might produce more meaningful data. Forrest 
(2012) did use bivalent stimuli in her attempt to promote associative learning in task 
switching. Contrary to Dreisbach et al.’s findings, participants who solved the 
paradigm without knowledge of the task rules demonstrated significant switch costs, 
albeit considerably smaller than those for participants who solved the tasks based on 
task instructions  (Forrest, Monsell, & McLaren, 2014; Forrest, 2012). Simulations 
using an associative learning algorithm (APECS) based on back propagation (Forrest, 
2012) also predicted small but reliable switch costs in the absence of task rules. 
Meier, Lea, Forrest, Angerer, and McLaren (2013) obtained similar results: their 
participants expressed significant switch costs regardless of whether or not they were 
able to verbalise the rules underlying each of the tasks, especially when responding to 
incongruent stimuli with bivalent response mappings. In summary, it would seem that 
human participants will exhibit switch costs in a task-switching paradigm using 
bivalent stimuli, regardless of whether they are using task-sets or simple associations 
between stimuli and responses.  
Unfortunately, even if careful precautions are in place and participants are 
thoroughly questioned about their approach to a paradigm, the use of task rules can 
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never be fully discounted when testing humans. Thus, it might prove difficult to 
assess whether executive control is indeed a necessary requirement to exhibit switch 
costs when using human participants. An obvious way around this problem is to test 
task-switching effects in animals that are presumed to be unable to rely on abstract 
task rules. There are a few animal studies available already that might provide some 
insight into what cognitive processes lead to the emergence of switch costs. Stoet and 
Snyder (2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009) were the first to investigate task-switching effects 
in non-human primates, specifically two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Switch 
costs were minimal, and in fact absent in one animal. In the light of these results, 
Stoet and Snyder (2003a, 2003b) assumed that monkeys might lack at least one of the 
cognitive mechanisms necessary to solve task-switching paradigms in the way 
humans do. However, they had no doubt that macaques nonetheless applied some 
form of executive control and did not consider the possibility that their results might 
be explained by associative mechanisms. 
Caselli and Chelazzi (2011), in an attempt to validate Stoet and Snyder's 
(2003a, 2003b) findings, exposed two rhesus macaques to a comparable task-
switching paradigm. Their subjects behaved remarkably similarly to Forrest's (2012) 
and Forrest et al.'s (2014) humans who memorised cue-stimulus-response 
contingencies, in that both monkeys demonstrated small but reliable switch costs. 
Caselli and Chelazzi declared these effects to be comparable to those expressed by 
humans, claiming that both species relied on the same executive-control processes 
when switching tasks. Like Stoet and Snyder, they acknowledged that, compared to 
humans, monkeys might be more limited in the extent to which they were able to 
perform the necessary task-set reconfiguration, but they took the fact that their 
subjects not only succeeded in a task-switching paradigm but also showed the 
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characteristic switch costs as evidence that rhesus macaques can employ executive 
control similar to humans. Their methods and conclusion, however, received major 
critique by Avdagic, Jensen, Altschul, and Terrace (2014), who themselves 
successfully taught three rhesus macaques to switch tasks in a simultaneous chaining 
paradigm. Their subjects showed no significant switch costs in doing so, replicating 
Stoet and Snyder's (2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009) results and casting doubt on Caselli 
and Chelazzi’s. Thus, as switch costs are evidently not always present in a task-
switching setting, as Forrest et al. (2014) and Forrest (2012) concluded, but may in 
fact be absent in the task-switching performance of nonhuman primates. Given this, 
do we have to assume that only human executive-control processes lead to switch 
costs, but executive control in monkeys does not? It might be more likely that 
macaques performed task switches based on associative processes instead of 
executive control, and thus do not suffer switch costs. 
The logical question that follows is addressed in this paper: will animals 
whose ability to exert executive control is severely limited compared to humans (or 
even macaques) exhibit switch costs when trained in a task-switching paradigm? Or 
will they predominately be susceptible to stimulus-congruency effects or other 
sequential effects that might be expected to occur if performance is based on 
associative processes? 
A promising candidate species in this regard might be the pigeon: pigeons 
have repeatedly demonstrated an absence of analytical processing where humans 
show it (Lea & Wills, 2008; Lea, Wills, Leaver et al., 2009; Maes, De Filippo, Inkster 
et al., 2015; Smith, Ashby, Berg et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Wills, Lea, Leaver et 
al., 2009). There are relatively few data at present concerning pigeons' task-switching 
abilities. Meier et al. (2013) were able to show that pigeons did not exhibit any switch 
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costs in a task-switching paradigm using bivalent stimuli, but that they were strongly 
affected by congruency effects. This lack of switch costs in the pigeons was, at the 
time, surprising because, with the same paradigm, significant switch costs were 
observed for human participants who were unaware of the rules of the competing 
tasks - and had thus presumably relied on the same associative-learning mechanisms 
to acquire the cue-stimulus-response contingencies as the pigeons. But the pigeons' 
lack of switch costs seems robust: Castro and Wasserman (2016) also tested pigeons 
in a task-switching paradigm, and similarly found an absence of any switch costs. On 
the face of it, these two studies strongly suggest that pigeons perform task switching 
quite differently to humans: it is not clear how associative learning could sufficiently 
explain the pigeons’ behaviour as well as the behaviour of participants memorising 
cue-stimulus-response contingencies in Forrest (2012) and Forrest et al. (2014). 
Given that the sample sizes both in Meier et al. (2013) and in Castro and 
Wasserman (2016) are rather small (in both studies, data from eight pigeons are 
reported), there is some concern about the power of their results and how confidently 
the lack of switch costs can be accepted. In the following two experiments, we 
address this concern, and, to anticipate, establish that there are indeed no detectable 
switch costs in the performance of pigeons in a task-switching paradigm.  
Furthermore, in Experiment 2, we consider another important issue that the 
experiments already reported in the literature did not address: in order to be confident 
in accepting the conclusion that pigeons produce no switch costs in task-switching 
paradigms, it is necessary to demonstrate not only that they can solve the problem - as 
was clearly the case in Meier et al. (2013) and Castro and Wasserman (2016) - but 
that perceptual features of the cue, stimulus or response of one trial affect 
performance on the next trial. Only then can we be confident that the study design 
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was sensitive enough to pick up any task-switch costs that might have occurred, 
making their absence informative. Again to anticipate, we establish that pigeons, 
although lacking switch costs, do nonetheless show signs of other sequential trial-
order effects; that is, their performance on a given trial is affected by features of the 
previous trial. This enabled us to produce an associative explanation of the pigeons' 
performance, couched in terms of Pearce's (1987; 1994) configural theory. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
When adapting a paradigm intended to measure human executive control for 
the use with pigeons, it is important to ensure that the paradigm will still produce 
valid data when tested on human participants. This was done by Meier et al. (2013), 
and so we largely adopted those procedures here. In order to generate a valid 
comparative paradigm, we also have to confirm that well-known task-switching 
effects in humans and other animals can also be detected in pigeons. One effect that is 
universally observed in different species during task switching is the congruency 
effect (Monsell, 2003; Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b): even when switch costs were 
absent, subjects consistently showed poorer performance when responding to 
incongruent stimuli than when responding to congruent stimuli. A valid task-
switching paradigm should be able to generate this effect. Therefore, if we can 
confirm a performance effect of stimulus congruency in pigeons, it is reasonable to 
assume that the paradigm is suitable for detecting any potentially present switch costs, 
as well. 
The conventional methods of measuring task-switching performance in 
humans have to be adjusted to suit inter-species comparison. Switch costs are usually 
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assessed via the time it takes humans to respond, since the delayed reaction time on 
task-switch trials compared to task-repeat trials is seen as evidence that time-
consuming executive-control processes were in action. With the testing apparatus 
currently available to us, an accurate recording of reaction times for pigeons was 
problematic, which made it difficult to estimate any differences in pigeons' reaction 
time in response to task-switch versus task-repeat trials. In addition, the time that our 
subjects had to respond to a stimulus could not be restricted in the same way as it is 
generally done in conventional human task-switching paradigms (Forrest, 2012; 
Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). To foreshadow, 
while reaction times are typically less than a second in humans (Dreisbach et al., 
2006, 2007; Forrest, 2012; Monsell, 2003), our pigeons took several seconds to 
respond. However, in humans, switch costs and congruency effects are equally 
apparent in the accuracy with which the task-appropriate response is made on a given 
trial, as humans generally make more errors in switch trials compared to repeat trials, 
and in response to incongruent stimuli compared to congruent stimuli (Altmann & 
Gray, 2008; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Recording the 
accuracy with which pigeons respond is easily accomplished, and, for the reasons 
stated above, proved to be a more suitable measure for assessing task-switching 
effects in our pigeons than reaction times. 
We also found that it was necessary to give pigeons a relatively long and 
variable inter-trial interval to aid performance (cf. trial-spacing effect; Todd & 
Bouton, 2012). Whilst the human task-switching literature recognises that longer 
intervals can decrease switch costs if subjects are able to prepare for the upcoming 
task during the interval, this should not be an issue with cued task-switching 
paradigms such as the one used in the current study, because task preparation is not 
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possible prior to the appearance of a task cue. Nevertheless, one risk of using long 
inter-trial intervals might be that any carry-over effects from the previous trial or task 
are diminished. We address this issue in Experiment 2 when examining any potential 
interference from the previous trial. 
 
 Methods 
Subjects 
Eight pigeons (Columbia livia) took part in the experiment. They were 
obtained as discards from local fanciers. Pigeons were housed together in an indoor 
aviary (2 x 1 x 2.5m) and were maintained at or above 80% of their free-feeding 
weight. The pigeons had previously received touch-screen training, but were naïve to 
the testing stimuli and were required to learn the correct behaviour by trial and error.   
 
Apparatus 
The pigeons were tested in eight identical 71x50.5x43.5cm operant chambers. 
Each pigeon was always tested in the same chamber. One of the long walls of the 
chamber was fitted with a 31x23.5cm (15") touch monitor (Model 1547L 
1024x768pxl TFT monitor, CarrollTouch infrared detector, ELO Touchsystems Inc.) 
mounted 12cm above the grid floor of the chamber. Two 2.8-Watt white houselights 
were mounted to either side above the screen; below the screen, mounted 4cm above 
the chamber floor and directly below each house light, two 6x5cm apertures gave 
access to grain hoppers when solenoids were activated. The food hoppers were 
illuminated by a 2.8-Watt light when activated and contained a 2:1 mixture of hemp 
seed and conditioner. A 50-Ohm loudspeaker mounted between the two food hoppers 
played white noise into the box and also indicated all effective pecks to target areas 
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on screen with an immediate feedback beep. The interior of the box was monitored by 
a video camera attached to the short wall of the chamber opposite the chamber door. 
Contingencies were controlled and data collected using a PC computer running the 
Whisker system (Cardinal & Aitken, 2010), with client programs written in Visual 
Basic 6.0. 
 
Stimulus Materials 
Stimuli were made up as circular Gaussian patches of 200 pixels in diameter. 
They consisted of one of four sinusoidal grating patterns that differed from one 
another in two dimensions: line orientation - either horizontal or vertical - and spatial 
frequency - either low (2 cycles per 100 pixels) or high (12 cycles per 100 pixels). 
The grating patterns were then superimposed on red, yellow, green or blue 
backgrounds. Figure 1 depicts four of the possible stimuli that resulted from these 
combinations. 
The correct response towards a stimulus depended on the currently relevant 
task. There were two tasks, referred to as A and B. For half the subjects, task A 
required responding according to the spatial frequency of the grating pattern. That is, 
if a stimulus, regardless of the orientation of its pattern, had a low spatial frequency, 
the correct response towards this stimulus was to choose response 1 (e.g., peck a 
response key presented on the left of the screen), while stimuli with a high spatial 
frequency required choosing response 2 (e.g., the response key located on the right). 
In task B, stimuli had to be classified according to the orientation of the grating 
pattern, regardless of its spatial frequency. Thus, if a stimulus showed a horizontal 
pattern, it required response 1, while a vertical pattern afforded response 2. For the 
remaining subjects, the relevant stimulus dimensions of task A and B were reversed. 
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Tasks were cued by colour-filled circles of 200 pixels in diameter. Each of the two 
tasks was associated with two distinct cues: these were blue or yellow circles for task 
A, and red or green circles for task B. Although blue and yellow were always both 
assigned to task A, the stimulus dimensions (spatial frequency or orientation) that 
were important for classification in that task and the location of the response key that 
was associated with any cue-stimulus combination were counterbalanced across 
pigeons. As each stimulus always contained both spatial frequency and orientation 
information, some stimuli always required the same response; e.g., a horizontal 
pattern of low spatial frequency might always require response 1 regardless of the 
current task. In contrast to these congruent stimuli, incongruent stimuli required 
opposite responses in the two tasks. For example, a horizontal stimulus with a high 
spatial frequency pattern might require response 1 in the orientation task but response 
2 in the spatial-frequency task. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure described below is illustrated in Figure 2. Each trial began with 
the presentation of a white circular observing key (100 pixels in diameter) presented 
in the centre of a black display to focus attention to the screen. Following two pecks 
at the observing key, it was replaced by one of the four task cues. The pigeons had to 
peck the cue twice, after which a stimulus appeared superimposed on the cue colour 
so that information of both the cue and the stimulus were presented simultaneously in 
the centre of the display. Examples of what these combined cue-stimulus images 
looked like can be seen in Figure 1. Pecking on the cue-stimulus combination resulted 
in its deletion from the centre of the screen and its immediate reappearance 200 pixels 
to both the left and the right side of the display centre. A response was made by 
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choosing the correct response location (left or right) that was associated with the 
present cue-stimulus combination and pecking on the stimulus presented in that 
location. Two successive pecks at the correct location resulted in the activation of the 
corresponding food magazine for 2.5 seconds and the end of the trial. Pecks at the 
incorrect key had no scheduled consequences. The inter-trial-interval to the next 
presentation of the observing key lasted 15 to 30 seconds. 
 
Training 
Pigeons received training on each task separately before attempting the task-
switching paradigm. The order in which the tasks were learned was counterbalanced 
across individuals. There were daily training sessions, each administered in three 
blocks of 24 trials in such a way that the eight possible combinations of the two cues 
of the task currently being trained and the four stimuli were shown three times per 
block. The first block of each session included a 25th trial (a repeat of the first trial of 
the session, as the first trial was not included in the analysis of daily performance), 
resulting in 73 trials per day in total. The order of cue-stimulus combinations was 
randomized within blocks. After successfully acquiring one task, subjects proceeded 
to training on the competing task. For each task, discrimination of the stimuli was 
considered successful if the subject responded correctly on at least 80% of trials 
within a daily training session, for at least three consecutive sessions. The pigeons 
acquired their first task in a mean of eight sessions; the second task was learned in a 
mean of six sessions. Once performance in the second task reached criterion, pigeons 
received further training sessions on the first task until they passed criterion again, 
followed by retraining sessions for the second task. The number of sessions on each 
task was gradually reduced until pigeons were able to switch between tasks from one 
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day to the next and still perform at or above 80% correct responses in each session. 
Finally, pigeons received three sessions consisting of four blocks of 24 trials each, in 
which the task changed from one block to the next, to ensure that they were able to 
switch between the two tasks within the same session. The entire training was 
completed in a mean of 46 sessions. 
 
Test 
Once each task had been trained separately to criterion, subjects entered the 
task-switching part of the experiment, in which task A and task B trials were 
intermingled. The task sequence was partially randomized to produce a switch trial in 
one third of trials. Task cues always changed from the previous trial in switch trials. 
Because there were two cues for each task, it was possible to alternate between the 
relevant task cues on repeat trials to avoid the possibility that the same cue was 
presented on two consecutive trials. The pigeons received 20 sessions of 73 trials 
each, a total of 1460 trials.  
 
Results 
Our main dependent variable is error rate when choosing a response key, 
though, for completeness, we also recorded the latency from the onset of the response 
display to the peck at the correct response key resulting in the operation of the food 
magazine. Trials immediately following an incorrect response were excluded, in case 
a wrong response indicated that subjects had been unable to execute the relevant task 
of that trial, in which case the next trial could not be regarded as either a switch or a 
repeat trial. The first trial of each session was also excluded, as it was neither a switch 
nor a repeat trial. 
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Pigeons' error rates were generally low (M=8.8%, SD=3.1); since the pigeons 
had received substantial training, this overall error rate was significantly better than 
50% chance performance, t(7)=37.57, p<.001. 
The significance of any task-switching effects was investigated by a repeated-
measures ANOVA using Trial Type (Task-Repeat or Task-Switch trial), Stimulus 
Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) and Sessions as within-subject factors. 
Where appropriate, significance levels were subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. The 
results of this analysis are summarised in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 3. 
The effect of the factor Trial Type was non-significant: as seen in Figure 3, 
pigeons demonstrated no sign of any switch costs (Task-Repeat: 9.1% vs. Task-
Switch: 8.9%). However, Stimulus Congruency strongly influenced performance, as 
pigeons showed increased error rates when responding to an incongruent stimulus 
compared to responding to a congruent stimulus (Incongruent: 14.3% vs. Congruent: 
3.6%; both values are significantly different from 50% chance performance, 
t(7)=41.52 and t(7)=22.18, respectively, adjusted p<.002).  
Stimulus Congruency did not interact with Trial Type, and pigeons showed no 
indication of increased error rates when switching tasks in response to stimuli of 
either congruency (switch costs on congruent trials: -0.6%, p=.301; on incongruent 
trials: 0.2%, p=.850). The pigeons did not show any significant changes in their error 
rates across sessions, nor did the progression in the experiment affect the magnitude 
of switch costs or congruency effects.  
As expected, reaction times of pigeons were slow, and too variable to show 
consistent congruency effects (Incongruent: 6919ms vs. Congruent: 7109ms; 
F(1,7)=2.17, p=.184) or switch costs (Task-Repeat: 7047ms vs. Task-Switch: 
6981ms; F(1,7)=3.27, p=.113). 
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In light of the remarkable absence of any switch costs in the pigeons' 
performance, the accuracy data were also examined by estimating a Bayes factor 
using the Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA function in JASP (Love, Selker, 
Marsman et al., 2015). The estimated Bayes factor (Congruency / Trial Type + 
Congruency) suggested that the data were 0.091:1 in favour of the null hypothesis, 
that is, the data are 11.04 times more likely to occur under a model assuming only an 
effect of Stimulus Congruency rather than a model including Trial Type as a second 
factor. 
Finally, in addition to the first-order transitions from trial N-1 to trial N, we 
also assessed the potential influence of second-order transitions from trial N-2 on 
performance on trial N with a repeated-measures ANOVA including first-order (Task-
Repeat and Task-Switch trials) and second-order transitions (Task-Repeat and Task-
Switch trials). We found no significant effects, all p>.13. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that pigeons were able to perform well in our 
version of the task-switching paradigm. Their error rates were well below chance, and 
they exhibited a very strong congruency effect. Nevertheless, they did not show any 
hint of switch costs. The lack of any switch costs for the congruent stimuli supports 
Dreisbach et al.'s (2006, 2007) claim that an associative acquisition of task-switching 
paradigms can eliminate switch costs for univalent stimuli. The lack of any switch 
cost for the incongruent stimuli, however, is inconsistent with Forrest (2012) and 
Forrest et al.'s (2014) claim that switch costs could appear in response to incongruent 
stimuli when associative learning was in play. This inconsistency is exacerbated by 
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the fact that Forrest et al. (2014) provided simulations to back up their claim. We shall 
return to this point later.  
For the moment our main concern is to increase the power of our design to 
detect any task-switch costs in pigeons under these conditions, and, failing that, to 
demonstrate that our procedures are sufficiently sensitive to detect other common 
sequential effects, such as cue-repetition, stimulus-repetition or response-repetition 
effects. Experiment 2 addresses these issues. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Whilst Experiment 1 replicated the findings of previous task-switching studies 
with nonhuman animals, it could not clarify the apparent presence of 'switch costs' in 
human performance that presumably occurred as a consequence of associative 
processes (as in Meier, et al., 2013). In Experiment 2, we closely examined other trial-
order effects for pigeons to understand how associative processes might influence the 
emergence of costs on task-switch trials in the performance of humans but not in that 
of pigeons. 
The design in Experiment 1 was carefully controlled to adhere to what is 
thought to be best practice in the task-switching literature. For example, we took 
measures to address the common issue of separating the costs of switching a task from 
the costs of switching a cue. If a given task is indicated by the same cue on each trial, 
every task-repeat trial coincides with a repetition of the relevant task cue, while every 
task-switch trial also implies a change of the task cue. Previous studies have shown 
that this is a major contributor to the magnitude of switch costs (Altmann, 2006; 
Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan & Bundesen, 2004; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Monsell 
21 
 
 
& Mizon, 2006; Schneider & Logan, 2005), and, as a result, every effort is made 
nowadays to avoid presenting the same cue on consecutive trials. In Experiment 2 we 
relaxed this constraint: half of the task-repeat trials were now accompanied by a 
repeat of the task cue. This should increase the similarity of the current trial to the 
previous trial, facilitating the retrieval of the associated response performed on that 
previous trial and perhaps leading to better performance on task-repeat over task-
switch trials. 
Moreover, any benefit of immediate repetition should also extend to other 
features of the cue-stimulus compound – thus, we should observe improved 
performance when not only the same cue but also the same stimulus is presented in 
both the current and the previous trial, compared to trials in which the stimulus 
dimensions are visually different from the stimulus of the previous trial. More 
precisely, performance should peak on trials that repeat all components of the 
previous trial, i.e., those in which the cue, the stimulus and the required response are 
the same as in the immediately preceding trial. This benefit should be visible when 
comparing performance in such trials to performance in task-switch trials, and 
especially so if the stimulus of that trial is the same as in the previous trial but the 
required response can change - which is only possible for incongruent stimuli.  
To summarise, given that pigeons might show costs to performance on task-
switch trials compared to task-repeat trials with a cue repetition, but not when 
compared to task-repeat trials with a cue change (as in Experiment 1), the paradigm 
introduced in Experiment 1 was extended in Experiment 2 to include task-repeat trials 
with cue repetitions. Separately, we extended the analyses to not only investigate cue-
repetition effects, but also effects of repeating the same stimulus (with the same or a 
different response) on two consecutive trials. 
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Methods 
Subjects 
Fourteen pigeons took part in the experiment. Eight of the pigeons were those 
that had previously taken part in Experiment 1. They had proceeded to a similar 
experiment (not reported here) before entering Experiment 2. The other six pigeons 
had also experienced both of these experiments, but in reversed order (which 
excluded them from being part of the sample of Experiment 1), before entering 
Experiment 2.  
 
Procedure 
Experiment 2 used the same apparatus, stimulus material and (for the six novel 
pigeons) training procedure as described in Experiment 1. The only difference was 
that, at test, for the 2/3 of trials that were repeat trials, the relevant task cue was 
picked randomly so that in half of the repeat trials the cue changed from the previous 
trial (task-repeat trials) and in the other half the cue repeated (cue-repeat trials). 
Pigeons received 10 sessions of 73 trials each.  
 
Results 
The same trial-exclusion criteria used in Experiment 1 applied. Pigeons' error 
rates were low (M=11.8%, SD=5.8), since the pigeons had received considerable 
training, and this overall error rate was significantly better than 50% chance 
performance, t(13)=24.74, p<.001. 
The results were analysed by means of a repeated-measure ANOVA using 
Trial Type (Cue-Repeat, Task-Repeat or Task-Switch trial), Stimulus Congruency and 
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Sessions as within-subject factors. Where applicable, significance levels were 
subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. The results of this analysis are summarised in 
Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 shows that, once again, pigeons did not suffer from switch costs. As 
in Experiment 1, pigeons demonstrated no decrease in performance on Task-Switch 
trials (Cue-Repeat: 11.9%, Task-Repeat: 11.9%, Task-Switch: 11.1%).  However, 
Stimulus Congruency strongly influenced performance, with increased error rates 
when an incongruent stimulus was presented compared to when a congruent stimulus 
was shown (16.4% vs 6.8%); this effect was entirely unaffected by a change in tasks 
or cues, difference between Task-Switch and Task-Repeat (Cue-Repeat) trials in 
response to incongruent vs congruent stimuli: 0.9% vs -0.8% (0.7% vs 1.0%). Pigeons 
also did not experience any significant changes in their error rates or switch cost 
across sessions.  
Again, the accuracy data were also examined by estimating a Bayes factor 
using the Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA function in JASP (Love et al., 2015). 
The estimated Bayes factor (Congruency / Trial Type + Congruency) suggested that 
the data were 0.024:1 in favour of the null hypothesis, that is, the data are 41.78 times 
more likely to occur under a model assuming only an effect of Stimulus Congruency 
rather than a model including Trial Type as a second factor. 
In addition to the first-order transitions from trial N-1 to trial N, we assessed 
the potential influence of second-order transitions from trial N-2 to trial N with a 
repeated-measures ANOVA including first-order (Cue-Repeat, Task-Repeat and 
Task-Switch trials) and second-order transitions (Cue-Repeat, Task-Repeat and Task-
Switch trials). We found no significant effects, all p>.18. 
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To test the assumption that performance is better on trials that repeat all 
components (i.e., cue, incongruent stimulus and required response) of the previous 
trial compared to performance in task-switch trials in which the incongruent stimulus 
of that trial is the same as in the previous trial but the required response changes, we 
conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA including only incongruent stimuli, using 
Stimulus Repeat (repeating the same incongruent stimulus or switching from one 
incongruent stimulus to the other incongruent stimulus) and Trial Type (Cue-Repeat, 
Task-Repeat or Task-Switch trial) as within-subject factors. Where appropriate, 
significance levels were subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. As illustrated in Figure 
5, there was a highly significant interaction between the two factors (F(2,26)=13.6, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.51), but no significant main effect of either factor (both p>.26). Pigeons 
showed very low error rates on cue-repeat trials in which the incongruent stimulus 
repeated, and elevated error rates on switch trials in which the incongruent stimulus 
repeated. Conversely, when the stimulus on the previous trial shared no elements with 
the current stimulus (i.e., when the two opposing incongruent stimuli were shown on 
subsequent trials), error rates were very low when the task switched (and thus the 
required response was the same in both trials), and increased when the task repeated 
(and thus the required response changed) in cue-repeat and task-repeat trials. Thus, we 
have succeeded in demonstrating sequential effects in the data from this experiment, 
confirming that our procedures are sensitive to trial-order effects, and so have the 
potential to detect switch costs. 
 
Discussion 
Just as in Experiment 1, our pigeons did not show any switch costs. Instead, 
Figure 5 reveals a reliable pattern of pigeons tending to respond more accurately on 
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Cue-Repeat/Stimulus-Repeat, Task-Repeat/Stimulus-Repeat and Task-
Switch/Stimulus-Change trials, and to make more errors on Cue-Repeat/Stimulus-
Change, Task-Repeat/Stimulus-Change and Task-Switch/Stimulus-Repeat trials. 
Taken together, pigeons primarily showed increased error rates on those trials in 
which the correct response was opposite to the one required by the previous trial; 
conversely, they benefited from a repetition of the previously required response.  
Such an outcome would be expected if there was a tendency to return to the 
same response location that produced reinforcement in the previous trial rather than 
change to a different response alternative. Indeed, pigeons may have a tendency to do 
so (cf. Schneider, 2008; Schneider & Davison, 2005; Stubbs, Fetterman, & Dreyfus, 
1987; Morgan, 1974, had earlier shown a similar result with rats). 
It is plausible that the response location in itself became integrated into the 
cue-stimulus compound that pigeons associated with a reward; instead of 
instrumentally learning the correct behaviour (go left or right) afforded by a stimulus, 
pigeons might have associated the perceived combination of cue, stimulus and 
location as a whole with reinforcement (Meier, Lea, & McLaren, in press), and idea 
that is consistent with instance theory explanations of task switching (Logan, 1988) 
and the idea of event files (Hommel, 1998). As a consequence, the two response 
locations in which the stimulus was simultaneously presented in the choice display 
became aversive or appetitive depending on the opportunity to receive a reward by 
avoiding or approaching them. It is plausible that the spatial location of the reinforced 
stimulus in the previous trial became as strong a determinant of behaviour as other 
elements like the cue colour, or the spatial frequency or orientation of the stimulus 
(Campos, Debert, da Silva Barros, & McIlvane, 2011; Iversen, Sidman, & Carrigan, 
1986; Lionello & Urcuioli, 1998; Lipkens, Kop, & Matthijs, 1988; Sidman, 2009). 
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This is especially likely considering that, while spatial frequency or orientation can 
change depending on the visual angle from which they are perceived (for example, 
spatial frequencies decrease as one approaches them), the spatial position in which a 
pigeon held its head immediately before it received a reward is not so susceptible to 
variation. 
The pigeons' general response-repetition benefit is in contrast to the response-
repetition effects commonly observed in human task-switching: while humans also 
experience a benefit of repeating a response on task-repeat trials, being required to 
repeat the previous response on task-switch trials often incurs a cost to performance 
(Hübner & Druey, 2006; Kleinsorge, 1999; Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999; Mayr & 
Bryck, 2005). This fact might provide further evidence that pigeons' performance is 
not governed by the same cognitive processes that govern human task-switching 
performance. We will elaborate on this point in more detail in the general discussion. 
It is worth noting that the observed response-repetition effect also has 
implications for the validity of our paradigm: as mentioned above, we chose to 
administer a long inter-trial interval to aid performance. Using longer intervals could 
have introduced the risk of reducing any carry-over effects from the previous trial or 
task, so that any potential task-switch costs for pigeons became too small to be of 
significance. Despite the long ITI, however, the pigeons demonstrated large trial-to-
trial effects that captured the sequential influence of the preceding trial; thus, it is 
plausible to assume that any sequential effects of the task would also have been 
apparent. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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The main question that this article is concerned with is whether task-switching 
and the commonly observed costs of performing a task switch are necessarily the 
product of executive-control functions such as task-set reconfiguration, or whether 
task-switch costs can occur when performance is primarily mediated by associative 
learning.  
Previous work suggested that, when human participants solve a task-switching 
paradigm by learning cue-stimulus-response contingencies, switch costs might be 
eliminated when responding to response-congruent stimuli (Dreisbach, 2012; 
Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007). Similarly, pigeons did not show any switch costs when 
responding to congruent stimuli. Since the stimulus that is presented signals the 
required response unambiguously, no information about the currently relevant task is 
required to perform accurately – hence, congruent stimuli should favour stimulus-
response learning over the costly retrieval and reconfiguration of task-sets. 
More interestingly though, when responding to response-incongruent stimuli, 
humans consistently suffer from switch costs, even when they lack task awareness 
(Forrest et al., 2014; Forrest, 2012; Meier et al., 2013). These results have been 
simulated in associative models, which equally predicted small but reliable switch 
costs under pure associative-learning conditions; this has led Forrest (2012) and 
Forrest et al. (2014) to conclude that performance costs in task-switch trials might not 
necessarily be mediated by complex executive-control processes but could also 
emerge as a product of the automatic retrieval of cue-stimulus-response associations. 
Unfortunately, research on the task-switching abilities of animals is equivocal with 
respect to this assumption: none of the several independent studies on rhesus 
macaques could convincingly demonstrate switch costs in the monkeys’ performance 
(Avdagic et al., 2014; Stoet & Snyder, 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009). Similarly, the 
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present paper and previous research using pigeons (Castro & Wasserman, 2016; 
Meier et al., 2013) found no evidence that associative processes may lead to switch 
costs in response to incongruent stimuli - pigeons did not show any evidence of 
reduced performance when the tasks switched on trials with incongruent stimuli. 
Therefore, an alternative explanation for the occurrence of switch costs under some 
circumstances but not others may be required. One, perhaps the most likely, 
explanation is that switch costs emerge only when executive-control processes, such 
as task-set reconfiguration, are afforded by subjects relying on abstract task rules, but 
that when performance is governed by associative processes and subjects do not rely 
on task-sets, no task-switch costs ensue. The implication of this would be that, while 
pigeons (and macaques) behaved entirely associatively and thus lacked switch costs, 
any switch costs that were present in previous studies with humans indicate that the 
performance of those subjects was governed by executive-control processes, or at 
least different processes to those used by our pigeons.  
In the case of the pigeons, we have some evidence that this assumption is true, 
since pigeons were strongly affected by stimulus congruency. It has previously been 
suggested (i.e., Kiesel et al., 2007, Schneider, 2015) that this congruency effect is 
governed by an automatic retrieval of stimulus-response contingencies rather than 
executive-control processes. In the current context, it also provides evidence that the 
pigeons' behaviour was controlled by specific stimulus features, and that interference 
between the competing cue-stimulus-response contingencies did in fact affect their 
performance more than abstract task-sets. Further evidence for this fact is the clear 
benefit of response repetitions for pigeons. Response-repetition effects have also been 
shown by task-switching humans (Hübner & Druey, 2006; Kleinsorge, 1999; 
Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999; Mayr & Bryck, 2005), but with an important difference: to 
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humans, repeating the same response on two consecutive trials is only beneficial to 
performance on task-repeat trials – but on task-switch trials, having to repeat the 
previous response often comes at a cost. As mentioned earlier, the universal benefit to 
pigeons most likely stems from associative processes and the integration of stimulus 
location as another feature of the perceived cue-stimulus compound. In contrast, the 
observed costs of response repetitions in task-switch trials for human performance are 
most logically explained by the influence of task-sets (i.e., Kleinsorge, 1999): a 
change in a relevant task dimension that requires a recoding operation generalises to 
response selection, and in effect facilitates response alteration rather than response 
repetition. 
Whilst one possibility is that the switch costs reported in previous human 
studies were always due to executive control, another is that there was some 
associative component - especially given that computational-modelling accounts 
(Forrest et al., 2014; Forrest, 2012) confirm the possibility of the presence of switch 
costs under associative-learning conditions. How can we distinguish between these 
two possibilities? In order to address this question, is it worth looking at how Forrest 
(2012) explains the presence of switch costs in her APECS models. Switch costs 
could in part be an expression of the closer associative connection between cues that 
indicate the same task: if the same stimulus-response links in an associative network 
are repeatedly activated in the presence of certain task cues, this activation can 
strengthen the link between these cues themselves, resulting in an associative cue 
equivalence. This equivalence in turn selectively facilitates the retrieval of a stimulus-
response link on trials with equivalent cues, that is, task-repeat trials. 
 The crucial point may be that pigeons represent the various components of a 
trial quite differently to humans. Forrest's explanation relies on the assumption that 
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task cues are encoded as one of several components of a trial - as are the stimuli, or 
even the separate stimulus dimensions. Pigeons, however, may perceive the 
presentation of cue and stimulus as a single cue-stimulus compound. To the eye of a 
pigeon, a horizontal, low-spatial-frequency stimulus presented on a green task cue 
may be very different from a horizontal, low-spatial-frequency stimulus presented on 
a red cue, even though both combinations require the same response. Thus, in a way, 
even Forrest's associative algorithms obey a task structure in that the cues are 
regarded as providing separable information to the stimuli - to the pigeon, cues and 
stimuli may be indivisible elements of the same image.  
Keeping in mind the response-repetition effects on the pigeons' performance, 
this analysis can be taken even further to postulate that what the pigeons may do is not 
only to represent cue colour, stimulus orientation and spatial frequency as a 
compound, but also to encode whether this compound is to the left or right of the 
centre of the screen. We hypothesize that they employ Pavlovian processes to learn 
the problems we set them in this paper, and that the trial-to-trial sequential effects 
brought about by the application of these processes (see Figure 5) can be shown to 
result in very small to no switch costs. To illustrate this idea, we can give a concrete 
example specific to the paradigm used in this paper, by using one of the current, well 
validated models of Pavlovian conditioning in pigeons, specifically that due to Pearce 
(1987). In this model, pigeons (and other animals) learn by associating configurations 
of stimuli with outcomes, and these associations then generalize to other 
configurations that share elements with the trained configuration. Pearce gives a 
simple rule for generalization, which is: 
 
1. G(generalization) = NS x NS / TA x TB 
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where NS is the number of elements shared by stimulus configurations A and 
B, TA is the total number of elements in A and TB the total number of elements in B. 
In essence, this captures the idea that generalization between two configurations, A 
and B, is governed by the product of the proportion of A elements in B and the 
proportion of B elements in A. 
We shall make use of this idea, but because we are interested in sequential 
effects, i.e., the influence of trial N-1 on trial N, we will not require the learning rule 
specified by Pearce except to note that we assume that, for any given trial involving 
incongruent stimuli, when pigeons are performing on this problem, all these stimuli 
are at approximately the same level of associative strength, such that increments in 
this strength as a result of a trial will be approximately equal. We do not consider 
congruent stimuli here because typically performance is at near asymptotic levels for 
these stimuli, making any such increment very small. We assume that the increment is 
small, but non-negligible for incongruent stimuli, which allows us to perform a 
perturbation analysis of the sequential effects that can be expected on Pearce’s model. 
Our analysis also assumes that the pigeons are learning to approach the correct 
configuration, say AWL, where A is the cue, W the stimulus, and L denotes this is the 
left-hand key, and avoid the wrong configuration, which in this case would be AWR, 
where the R denotes the right-hand key. Thus, we take it that they learn a stimulus 
configuration using spatial location as one of the elements making up this 
configuration. We will consider the merits of this assumption later, but for now we 
show how our perturbation analysis would proceed and generate an estimate of the 
switch costs to be expected on the basis of this model using our paradigm. 
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There are four cues, which we call A, B, C, D, where A and B denote one task 
and C and D the other. There are also four stimuli, W, X, Y, Z, and we take W and X 
to be the incongruent stimuli. We denote spatial location by L and R, and this means 
that we have eight different configurations involving stimulus W. An example of two 
that could occur on the same trial would be AWL and AWR, and we assume that 
AWL is the correct choice on this trial. All these elements are, for simplicity, assumed 
to have equal salience. 
We are now in a position to proceed with our analysis. So, for example, if we 
are considering a trial on which cue A plus stimulus W occur and are correctly chosen 
on the Left, we would represent this as AWL+. As this combination would become 
more strongly associated with reward, its associative strength with reward would 
increase from its current value V to V+∂, where ∂ is the small increment to associative 
strength that occurred on that trial. In Pearce's model, this increment to associative 
strength will generalize, meaning that the effective increment to the other choice 
location on this trial, AWR (sharing 2 of a total of 3 elements with AWL), will be 2/3 
x 2/3 = 4/9 of ∂ following Equation 1. If the next trial is a repeat of the one that has 
just occurred, we can estimate how much better the pigeon will be on that trial as a 
result of this increment. The extra associative strength for the correct configural 
stimulus is ∂, the extra for the incorrect stimulus is 4∂/9, hence the net gain is 5∂/9. 
Table 3 shows this calculation and the other possible trial-to-trial transitions 
beginning with AWL+ on trial N-1.  
The calculations based on this analysis can be illustrated in a graph equivalent 
to Figure 5 (see Figure 6). To construct Figure 6, we used the negative of the values in 
the final column of Table 3, because a positive value in the table equates to fewer 
errors on that trial. The correspondence between this model and our data is 
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immediately apparent. On the basis of the model, it is possible to work out the 
expected switch costs: the average of Cue-Repeat and Task-Repeat trials is -.11∂; the 
average of Task-Switch trials is +.11∂; hence, the difference (the switch cost) is 
predicted to be .22∂. Given that ∂ is itself a small increment, and this is multiplied by 
a factor considerably less than 1, we can now see why the switch costs in our pigeons 
can be so small, even though there are measurable sequential effects in both our data 
and the model
2
.  
It only remains to explain why Forrest et al. (2014) observed switch costs 
(albeit smaller than usual) in their participants, if they were solving the problem 
associatively. We follow Forrest et al. in assuming that the human participants were 
learning to associate a combination of cue and stimulus with a left or right response, 
and not encoding all these components as one compound. We also follow the analysis 
there and in Forrest (2012) by assuming that humans developed cue equivalence, as 
discussed earlier, in the same way that APECS (an algorithm based on back 
propagation) did. With these assumptions, it is possible to generate an estimate of the 
switch costs using Pearce's (1987) generalisation rule. It comes to .50∂, i.e. more than 
double the estimate for the pigeons. The role of cue equivalence in generating this 
result is worth elaborating. Our simulation using Pearce (1987) for the pigeons is not 
actually affected by incorporating equivalence, but the instrumental version for 
humans is, and in this case increases the estimated switch costs. Thus, part of our 
                                                 
2
 While this model explains the results of the present study rather well, we make no 
claims about the applicability of the model to other task-switching studies conducted 
with nonhuman animals, like Castro and Wasserman’s (2016), Stoet and Snyder’s 
(2003a) or Avdagic et al.’s (2014). 
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answer may well lie in the fact that pigeons solve these problems using Pavlovian 
processes and humans instead solve them instrumentally when denied any task rules 
or task sets (cf. Meier et al., in press). This is an issue that we intend to pursue further 
in the future, but, for the moment, it suggests that the lack of any detectable switch 
costs in pigeons in our experiments may have been due to their reliance on a 
Pavlovian-conditioned approach in solving the problem, and that an instrumental 
solution was responsible for the small but detectable switch cost reported by Forrest et 
al. (2014). 
To conclude, we were able to show that, whilst task switching is possible 
without the involvement of executive control, the occurrence of switch costs is not 
inevitable under associative-learning conditions, as our pigeons evidently suffered no 
costs to performance when switching from one task to another. Nonetheless, despite 
an absence of task-switch costs for pigeons, the previous trial affected their 
performance on the next trial. By incorporating this finding into Pearce's (1987) 
model of stimulus categorisation, we conclude that pigeons acquired our task-
switching paradigm via Pavlovian processes, which resulted in an absence of switch 
costs. Further, Pearce's model also allowed us to make inferences about the reliable 
occurrence of switch costs when no task-sets are available to humans (Forrest et al., 
2014) and in simulations using an associative learning algorithm (APECS) based on 
back propagation (Forrest, 2012), suggesting that they are likely due to instrumental 
learning and the establishment of an equivalence between cues that signal the same 
task. 
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 Table 1. Experiment 1: Results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on error rates, 
using Trial Type (Task Repeat or Task Switch), Stimulus Congruency 
(Congruent or Incongruent) and Sessions as within-subject factors. 
 F df MSE p ηp
2
  
Trial Type 0.10 1, 7 .007 .766 .014  
Stimulus Congruency 75.62 1, 7 .026 <.001 .915  
Trial Type * Congruency 0.49 1, 7 .006 .508 .065  
Sessions 1.06 19, 133 .029 .399 .132  
Sessions * Trial Type 0.78 19, 133 .006 .725 .100  
Sessions * Congruency 1.60 19, 133 .005 .064 .186  
Sessions * Trial Type * 
Congruency 
1.17 19, 133 .006 .311 .143  
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 Table 2. Experiment 2: Results of a repeated-measures ANOVA on error rates, 
using Trial Type (Cue Repeat, Task Repeat or Task Switch), Stimulus 
Congruency (Congruent or Incongruent) and Sessions as within-subject factors. 
 F df MSE p ηp
2
  
Trial Type 0.62 2, 26 .012 .525 .046  
Stimulus Congruency 42.20 1, 13 .046 <.001 .764  
Trial Type * Congruency 0.75 2, 26 .012 .480 .055  
Sessions 1.44 9, 117 .009 .177 .100  
Sessions * Trial Type 1.05 18, 234 .009 .410 .075  
Sessions * Congruency 1.07 9, 117 .010 .388 .076  
Sessions * Trial Type * 
Congruency 
1.14 18, 234 .011 .321 .081  
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Table 3. Perturbation analysis of task-switching in pigeons based on Pearce (1987). 
 
Previous 
configuration 
Correct 
choice 
Incorrect 
choice 
Difference 
(correct-
incorrect) 
Cue Repeat + 
stimulus repeat 
AWL+ AWL AWR 5∂/9 
Task Repeat + 
stimulus repeat 
AWL+ BWL BWR 3∂/9 
Task Switch + 
stimulus repeat 
AWL+ CWR CWL -3∂/9 
Cue Repeat + 
stimulus change 
AWL+ AXR AXL -3∂/9 
Task Repeat + 
stimulus change 
AWL+ BXR BXL -1∂/9 
Task Switch + 
stimulus change 
AWL+ CXL CXR 1∂/9 
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a) 
 
 
 
b) 
 
 
 
c) 
 
 
 
 
d) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the four stimuli used in Experiment 1 and 2; a) low spatial 
frequency and horizontal orientation, b) high spatial frequency and horizontal 
orientation, c) low spatial frequency and vertical orientation and d) high spatial 
frequency and vertical orientation. Each stimulus was superimposed on one of the 
four cues; during test, all four stimuli were paired with all four cues, so that a pigeon 
experienced sixteen different cue-stimulus combinations (four of these possible 
combinations are presented here for illustration). 
Please refer to the online version of this article for the colour image. 
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Figure 2. Procedure of Experiment 1. Please refer to the online version of this article 
for the colour image. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1: Mean error rates depending on Trial Type (Task-Repeat and 
Task-Switch trials) and Stimulus Congruency (trials containing a congruent stimulus 
and trials containing an incongruent stimulus). Please refer to the text and Table 1 for 
mean differences and measures of variance. 
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Figure 4. Experiment 2: Mean error rates depending on Trial Type (Task-Repeat and 
Task-Switch trials) and Stimulus Congruency (trials containing a congruent stimulus 
and trials containing an incongruent stimulus). Please refer to the text and Table 2 for 
mean differences and measures of variance. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2: Mean error rates in trials in which an incongruent stimulus is 
presented and is the same as in the immediately preceding trial (Stimulus Repeat) or 
follows a trial in which the other incongruent stimulus appeared (Stimulus Change), 
depending on Trial Type. The pattern suggests a benefit of response repetitions (see 
text for details).  
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Figure 6. Plot of the perturbation analysis of task-switching in pigeons based on 
Pearce (1987). The dependent variable is the negative of the difference score reported 
in Table 3. Higher scores mean more errors. 
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